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Abstract
Small-to-medium size enterprises (SMEs), including many startup firms, need to manage inter-
related flows of cash and inventories of goods. In this paper, we model a firm that can finance its
inventory (ordered or manufactured) with loans in order to meet random demand which in general
may not be time stationary. The firm earns interest on its cash on hand and pays interest on its
debt. The objective is to maximize the expected value of the firm’s capital at the end of a finite
planning horizon. Our study shows that the optimal ordering policy is characterized by a pair of
threshold variables for each period as function of the initial state of the period. Further, upper and
lower bounds for the threshold values are developed using two simple-to-compute ordering policies.
Based on these bounds, we provide an efficient algorithm to compute the two threshold values. Since
the underlying state space is two-dimensional which leads to high computational complexity of the
optimization algorithm, we also derive upper bounds for the optimal value function by reducing the
optimization problem to one dimension. Subsequently, it is shown that policies of similar structure
are optimal when the loan and deposit interest rates are piecewise linear functions, when there is a
maximal loan limit and when unsatisfied demand is backordered. Finally, further managerial insights
are provided with numerical studies.
KEYWORDS: Inventory, finance, decision, threshold variables, myopic policy.
1 Introduction
In the current competitive environment, small-to-medium size enterprises (SMEs), including many
startup firms, must make joint decisions concerning interrelated flows of cash and products; cf. MaRS
(10 Apr. 2014). Cash is the lifeblood of any business and is often in short supply. Cash flows stem from
operations, financing and investing activities. To maximize profits, firms need to manage operations,
financing and investing activities, efficiently and comprehensively. For example, most startup firms need
access to funds, typically for ordering or manufacturing products; cf. Zwilling (6 Mar. 2013). As another
example, some small businesses are seasonal in nature, particularly retail businesses. If a business makes
most of its sales during the holiday season, it may need a loan prior to the holiday season to purchase
a large amount of inventory to gear up for that season. Such loans to purchase inventory are generally
short-term in nature and companies usually pay them off after the season is over with the proceeds of
sales from their seasonal sales.
To facilitate SME borrowing, Small Business Administration (SBA) has established a loan program with
a successful record. For example, Wells Fargo Capital Finance is the nation’s leading provider (by dollar
volume) of loans guaranteed by the SBA, providing loans to companies across a broad range of industries
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throughout the United States. Building on a strong track record, Wells Fargo works with companies in
many diverse industries, including apparel, electronics, furniture, housewares, sporting goods, toys and
games, food products, hardware, and industrial goods. Accordingly, small business loans at Wells Fargo
rose 18% in 2014; cf. Reuters (14 April 2015), WellsFargo.com (11 May 2015) and Finance.Yahoo.com
(14 May 2015).
In this paper we model and analyze the optimal financial and operational policy of an SME firm whose
inventory is subject to lost sales, zero replenishment lead times and periodic review over a finite planning
horizon. The firm’s state (i.e., inventory-capital profile) consists of inventory level and cash level, where
a positive cash level represents cash on hand while a negative cash level represents a loan position. Cash
flows are managed from the perspectives of operations, financing and investing in each period, as follows.
(i) From the operations perspective, the firm stocks up and sells inventory; (ii) From the financing per-
spective, the firm can use its cash on hand or an external short-term loan (if needed) to procure products
for inventory; (iii) From the investing perspective, any cash on hand is deposited in a bank account to
earn interest at a given rate, while debt incurs interest at a higher given rate. We develop and study a
discrete-time model for a single-product inventory system over multiple periods. The objective of the
firm is to dynamically optimize the order quantities in each period, given the current state of cash and
inventory, via joint operational/financial decisions, so as to maximize the expected value of the firm’s
capital (i.e., total wealth level) at the end of a finite time horizon.
The inventory flow is described as follows. At the beginning of each period, the firm decides on an
order quantity and the corresponding replenishment order materializes with zero lead time. During the
remainder of the period, no inventory transactions (demand fulfillment or replenishment) take place.
Rather, all such transactions are settled at the end of the period. Incoming demand is aggregated over
that period, and the total period demand draws down on-hand inventory. However, if the demand ex-
ceeds the on-hand inventory, then all excess demand is lost (the backorder setting is studied in §8.3).
All the leftover inventory (if any) is carried forward to the next period subject to a holding cost, and at
the last period, the remaining inventory (if any) is disposed of either at a salvage value or at a disposal
cost.
Cash flow typically takes place as follows. All transactions pertaining to previous period are settled
at its end. More precisely, the firm updates its cash position with the previous period’s revenue from
sales and interest earned from a deposit, or paid on outstanding debt (if any). The firm then decides
the order quantity for the next period and pays for replenishment as follows: first, with cash on hand,
and if insufficient, with a withdrawal from cash on deposit (there is no withdrawal penalty), and if still
insufficient, by an external loan. If not all cash on hand is used for replenishment, then any unused cash
is deposited in a bank where it earns interest. At the end of each period the resulting cash on hand or
debt are carried forward to the next period.
The main contribution of the paper is to establish and compute the optimal ordering policy in terms of
the net worth of the firm (operating capital in in product units and inventory on hand) at the beginning
of each period. It is shown that the optimal policy is characterized for each period n by a pair of threshold
variables, αn and βn where αn < βn; cf. Theorem 1 for the single period problem and Theorem 3 for the
multi-period problem. The threshold values, αn and βn, are in general functions of the firm’s net worth.
This optimal policy has the following structure: a) If the net worth is less than αn, then the firm orders
up to αn, a case referred to as the over-utilization case. b) If the net worth is greater than βn, then the
firm orders up to βn, a case referred to as the under-utilization case. c) Otherwise, when the net worth
is between αn and βn, then the firm orders exactly as many units as it can afford without borrowing, a
case referred to as the full-utilization case. For the single period problem, we further derive the optimal
solution in closed form and show that the (α, β) optimal policy yields a positive expected value even
with zero values for both initial inventory and cash. For the multi-period problem, we construct two
myopic policies, which provide upper and lower bounds for the threshold values, respectively. Based
on these upper and lower bounds, we provide an algorithm for computing the two thresholds, αn and
βn, recursively for all periods n. Since the underlying state space is two-dimensional, it leads to high
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computational complexity of the optimization algorithm, we derive upper bounds for the optimal value
function by reducing the optimization problem to one dimension. Subsequently, it is shown that policies
of similar structure are optimal when the loan and deposit interest rates are piecewise linear functions,
when there is a maximal loan limit and when unsatisfied demand is backordered; cf. Theorems 6, 7 and
8, respectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and Section 3
formulates the model. In Section 4, the single-period model is developed and the optimal (α, β) policy
is derived, where the threshold values are functions of the demand distribution and the cost parameters
of the problem. Section 5 extends the analysis for the dynamic multi-period problem and derives a
two-threshold structure, (αn, βn) policy, for the optimal policy via a dynamic programming analysis.
Section 6 introduces two myopic policies that provide upper and lower bounds for each αn and βn, based
on which an efficient searching algorithm for αn and βn is presented. An upper bound for the value
function is also introduced. Numerical studies are presented in Section 7. In Section 8, it is pointed
out that simple modifications of the underlying model allow the extension of the results to the case
of piecewise linear interest rate functions, a maximal loan limit and backorder of unsatisfied demand.
Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Literature Review
In a seminal study, Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that in a perfect capital market with adequate and
inexpensive external funding, a firm’s operational and financial decisions can be made separately. Since
then, most literature in inventory management extended the classical newsvendor problem in a variety of
ways, but assuming that decision makers are not subject to financial constraints. However, in view of the
imperfection of real-life capital market, a growing body of literature has begun to consider operational
decision making subject to financial constraints. In those studies, inventories of goods are often treated
as special financial instruments; cf. Singhal (1988). Accordingly, portfolios of physical products and
financial instruments have been studied using finance/investment principles such as Modern Portfolio
Theory (MPT) and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). For related literature, the reader is referred to
Corbett et al. (1999) and references therein. Further, the relationship between inventories and finance,
along with their theoretical and empirical consequences, are discussed in Girlich (2003).
The growing literature on the interface between operations management and financial decisions can be
categorized into two major strands: single-agent and game related multiple-agent streams. Each stream,
attendant models can be further classified as single-period and multi-period models. Our study belongs
to the single-agent strand and addresses both single-period and multi-period models.
In the single-agent strand, a firm operational decisions and financial decisions are typically made simul-
taneously, but without interacting with other firms. Considering an imperfect market, Xu and Birge
(2004) develop models with simultaneous production and financing decisions in the presence of demand
uncertainty, which illustrates how a firm’s production decisions are affected by the existence of financial
constraints. Recently, Birge and Xu (2011) present an extension of a model in Xu and Birge (2004) by
assuming that debt and production scale decisions have fixed costs necessary to maintain operations,
variable costs of production, and volatility in future demand forecasts. Building on their previous work
of Xu and Birge (2004), Xu and Birge (2008) review that analysis and consider the effect of different op-
erating conditions on capital structure, and exhibit some empirical support of their previously predicted
relationship between production margin and market leverage. Cai et al. (2014) investigate the roles of
bank and trade credits in a supply chain with a capital-constrained retailer facing demand uncertainty.
The studies above focus on single-period problems.
Some single-agent, multi-period problems are addressed in Hu and Sobel (2005) and Li et al. (2013).
Here, multi-period models posit different interest rates on cash on hand and outstanding loans. These
papers also demonstrate the importance of the joint consideration of production and financing decisions
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in a start-up setting in which the ability to grow the firm is mainly constrained by its limited capital
and dependence on bank financing. For example, Hu and Sobel (2005) examine the interdependence
of a firm’s capital structure and its short-term operating decisions concerning inventories, dividends,
and liquidity. To this end, Hu and Sobel (2005) formulate a dynamic model to maximize the expected
present value of dividends. Li et al. (2013) study a dynamic model of managerial decisions in a manu-
facturing firm in which inventory and financial decisions interact and are coordinated in the presence of
demand uncertainty, financial constraints, and default risk. It is shown that the relative financial value
of coordination can be made arbitrarily large. In addition, Gupta and Wang (2009) study a retailer’s
dynamic inventory problem (both discrete and continuous review) in the presence of random demand
while the retailer is financially supported by trade credit from its supplier, contingent on the age of the
inventory. It is shown that the optimal policy is a base stock policy where the base stock level is affected
by the offered credit terms. Luo and Shang (2013) study a centralized supply chain consisting of two
divisions (modeled as echelons), of which the headquarter division manages the financial and operational
decisions with a cash pool. They focus on analyzing the value of cash pooling.
The work most closely related to this study is Chao et al. (2008) and Gong et al. (2014). The first
reference considers a single-agent multi-period problem for a self-financing retailer without external loan
availability. It shows that the optimal, cash flow-dependent, policy in each period, is uniquely determined
by a single critical value. Our study differs from Chao et al. (2008) in several ways. First, from a model-
ing perspective, Chao et al. (2008) consider a self-financing firm without access to external credit, while
we consider possible loan which provides the retailer with the flexibility of ordering a larger quantity to
achieve a higher fill rate. The consideration of loan intertwines the financial decision (e.g., how much
to borrow) with the operational decision (e.g., how many to order) as well as the investment decision
(how much to deposit for additional interest). In this case, the complexity of the problem is raised from
one dimension (operational decision alone) to two dimensions (joint operational and financial decisions).
Further, Chao et al. (2008) assume an iid demand process and time-stationary costs, while we consider
a non-stationary demand process and time varying (loan and deposit) interest rates. Second, in terms
of results, Chao et al. (2008) structure the optimal policy as a base stock policy with a single threshold
value; while our paper shows that the optimal policy is characterized by two threshold values, which
divide the ordering decision space into three intervals to guide financing, operational and investment
decisions. Gong et al. (2014) study a similar model to maximize the expected terminal total capital but
along different lines from ours. However, this paper differs in several aspects as follows. In terms of
model setting, we consider non-stationary demand process and time varying (loan and deposit) interest
rates as well as an extension to realistic piecewise loan rates. In terms of results, our optimal policy
is presented in terms of two thresholds per period (multiple thresholds for the case of piecewise loan
rates), while Gong et al. (2014) analyze a single-threshold policy. Computationally, we develop simple
easy-to-compute policies (based on single period information) which provide lower and upper bounds
for each of the two threshold values, and we propose an efficient algorithm for the computation of the
optimal policy. Further we provide upper and lower bounds for the value function. Finally we develop
further managerial insights into the interplay between operational, financial and investment decisions.
In a second strand of the literature, multi-agent competition between firms and financial institutions has
been investigated using game theoretic approaches. This literature includes, but is not limited to, Buza-
cott and Zhang (2004), Dada and Hu (2008), Yasin and Gaur (2012) and Raghavan and Mishra (2011).
Most such papers deal with a single-period problem. Buzacott and Zhang (2004) analyzes a Stackelberg
game between the bank and the retailer in a newsvendor inventory model. Dada and Hu (2008) assume
that the interest rate is charged by the bank endogenously and use a game model to capture the relation
between the bank and the inventory controller through which an equilibrium is derived and a non-linear
loan schedule is obtained to coordinate the channel. Yasin and Gaur (2012) study the implications of
asset based lending for operational investment, probability of bankruptcy, and capital structure for a
borrower firm. Raghavan and Mishra (2011) study a short-term financing problem in a cash-constrained
supply chain.
As a part of the second literature strand, multi-agent game-theoretic approaches have also been used
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to model the competition between suppliers and retailers. Such recent studies include Kouvelis and
Zhao (2011a) and Kouvelis and Zhao (2011b) among many others. An important portion of this strand
addresses the impact of trade credits provided by suppliers to retailers. Lee and Rhee (2010) study
the impact of inventory financing costs on supply chain coordination by considering four coordination
mechanisms: all-unit quantity discount, buy backs, two-part tariff, and revenue-sharing. It is shown
that using trade credits in addition to contracts, a supplier can fully coordinate the supply chain and
achieve maximal joint profit. Further, Lee and Rhee (2011) model a firm with a supplier that grants
trade credits and markdown allowances. Given the supplier’s offer, it determines the order quantity
and the financing option for the inventory under either trade credit or direct financing from a financial
institution. The impact of trade credits from an operational perspective is also studied in Yang and
Birge (2013), which investigates the role that trade credit plays in channel coordination and inventory
financing. It is shown that when offering trade credits, the supplier balances its impact on operational
profit and costs. Other related work of ours includes: Shi et al. (2014), Katehakis and Smit (2012), Zhou
et al. (2007), Zhao and Katehakis (2006).
3 Model Formulation
Consider a time horizon N := {1, 2, . . . , N} where the periods are indexed forward. At the beginning
of period n ∈ N , let the “inventory-capital” state of the system be characterized by a vector (xn, yn),
where xn ≥ 0 denotes the amount of on-hand inventory (number of product units) and yn denotes the
amount of product that can be purchased using all the available capital, i.e., yn is the capital position
measured in “product units”. Let qn ≥ 0 denote the order quantity the firm uses in the beginning of
period n ∈ N . The ordering cost per unit is cn ≥ 0. We assume that any order quantity can be fully
satisfied within zero lead time of replenishment. Let Dn ∈ <+ denote the random demand during period
n which follows a general distribution. We assume that demands of different periods are independent
but could be generally non-stationary across periods. Let fn(·) and Fn(·) denote the probability density
function (pdf) and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of Dn, respectively. The selling price per
unit is pn ≥ cn.
Throughout all periods n = 1, . . . , N − 1, any unsold units are carried over in inventory to be used in
subsequent periods subject to a constant holding cost hn ≥ 0 per unit over period n, and any unmet
demand is lost. The backorder setting of the problem is studied in §8.3. At the end of the horizon,
i.e., the end of period N , all leftover inventory (if any) will be salvaged (or disposed off) at a constant
price (cost) s per unit. Note that we allow a negative s in which case s represents a disposal cost
per unit, e.g., the unit cost of disposing vehicle tires. For notational convenience, we denote hN = −s
in the sequel, so that the salvage value (or disposal cost) s is treated uniformly as a type of inventory cost.
To finance inventory, a loan can be applied at interest rate `n ≥ 0. Interest rates are fixed and depend
entirely upon current market conditions. For example, Lending Club provides Small Business Loans at a
fixed rate financing up to $300,000 (Lending Club is a US peer-to-peer lending company, headquartered
in San Francisco, California). When there remains unused capital after an ordering decision, the unused
capital is deposited in a bank account to earn interest at rate in ≥ 0. To avoid trivialities, we assume
that in < `n and it is possible to achieve a positive profit with the aid of a loan, i.e., (1 + `n)cn < pn.
This assumption can be equivalently written as 1 + `n < pn/cn. Note also, that the above assumption
implies 1 + in < pn/cn since in < `n; namely, investing on inventory is more profitable than depositing
available capital in the bank.
Given the initial inventory-capital state as (xn, yn), if an order of size qn ≥ 0 is placed and the demand
during the period is Dn, then we have the following operational and financial cash inflows:
• The cash flow from operational sales of items (i.e., the realized revenue from inventory) at the end
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of the period is given by
Rn(Dn, qn, xn) = pn ·min{qn + xn, Dn} − hn · [qn + xn −Dn]+
= pn · [qn + xn − (qn + xn −Dn)+]− hn · [qn + xn −Dn]+
= pn(qn + xn)− (pn + hn) · [qn + xn −Dn]+, (1)
where [a]+ = max{a, 0} denotes the positive part of real number a, and the second equality holds
by min{a, b} = a− [a− b]+.
• The cash flow from capital (i.e., the realized revenue from financial investment) at the end of the
period is computed for each of the following investing and financing scenarios:
i) Investing decision: If the order quantity satisfies 0 ≤ qn ≤ yn, then the leftover amount
cn·(yn−qn) of cash is deposited in the bank and will yield a positive inflow of cn·(yn−qn)(1+in)
at the end of the period n.
ii) Financing decision: If the order quantity satisfies qn > yn (including the case qn = 0 > yn),
then a loan amount of cn · (qn − yn) will be borrowed during the period and will result in a
cash outflow of cn · (qn − yn)(1 + `n) at the end of the period.
In summary, the cash flow from the bank (positive or negative) can be written in general as
Kn(qn, yn) = cn · (yn − qn)
[
(1 + in)1{qn≤yn} + (1 + `n)1{qn>yn}
]
. (2)
Note that the cash inflow from inventory, Rn(Dn, qn, xn) is dependent on Dn while independent of yn.
In a similar vein, the cash flow from capital, Kn(qn, yn) is independent of the initial on-hand inventory,
xn and the demand size Dn, but is dependent on yn. Also, note that the ordering cost, cn · qn, has been
accounted for in Eq. (2) while the remaining capital, if any, is invested in the bank and its value at the
end of the period is given by Kn(qn, yn).
Since the order quantity qn = qn(xn, yn) is decided at the beginning of period n as a function of (xn, yn),
it is readily shown that the state process {(xn, yn)} under study is a Markov decision process (MDP)
with decision variable qn; cf. Ross (1992). The state dynamics of the system, i.e., inventory flow and
cash flow, are given as follows, for n = 1, 2, ..., N − 1
xn+1 = [xn + qn −Dn]+; (3)
yn+1 = [Rn(Dn, qn, xn) +Kn(qn, yn)]/cn+1, (4)
where Rn and Kn refer to the capital gain from operational and financial decisions, as given by Eqs.
(1)-(2), respectively.
Note that, at the beginning of period n, the interplay between finance and operation is one way. Namely,
it is feasible to purchase products with available capital yn (when yn > 0), but it is typically restricted
to convert any on-hand inventory xn into cash. Conversely, the sales interplay between finance and
operations is opposite, namely, sales deplete the inventory and contributes to cash on hand.
Thus, we have the following dynamic programming formulation:
Vn(xn, yn) = sup
qn≥0
E
[
Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)|xn, yn
]
, n = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1 (5)
where the expectation is taken with respect to Dn, and xn+1, yn+1 are given by Eqs. (3), (4), respectively.
For the final period N, we have
VN (xN , yN ) = sup
qN≥0
E
[
RN (DN , qN , xN ) +KN (qN , yN )
]
. (6)
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4 The Single Period Problem
The analysis of the last period N is a typical single-period problem and its objective function is given
by Eq. (6). For notational convention, we omit the subscript N for each related variable when denoting
counterparts under the single period setting, without causing any confusion.
Accordingly, for any given initial “inventory-capital” state (x, y) and ordering decision q ≥ 0, the ex-
pected value of net worth at the end of the period is given by
G(q, x, y) = p (x+ q)− (p− s)
∫ x+q
0
(x+ q − t)f(t)dt+ c (y − q)
[
(1 + i)1{q≤y} + (1 + `)1{q>y}
]
. (7)
The following lemma summarizes the important properties of the function G(q, x, y).
Lemma 1. Function G(q, x, y) is continuous in q, x and y, and it has the following properties.
i) It is concave in q ∈ [0,∞), for all x, y and all s < p.
ii) It is increasing and concave in x, for s ≥ 0.
iii) It is increasing and concave in y, for all s < p.
Remarks.
1. It is important to point out that G(q, x, y) might not increase in x if s < 0. In particular, if s
represents a disposal cost, i.e., s < 0, then ∂G(q, x, y)/∂x might be negative, which implies that
G(q, x, y) is decreasing for some high values of x.
Further, for the special case s < 0, it is of interest to locate the critical value, x′ such that G(q, x, y)
is decreasing for x > x′. To this end, we set Eq. (46) to be zero, which yields
(p− s) · F (q + x) = p. (8)
Therefore,
x′ = F−1
(
p
p− s
)
− q, (9)
where F−1(·) is the inverse function of F (·). Eq. (9) shows that a higher disposal cost, −s, implies
a lower threshold for x′ above.
2. Lemma 1 implies that higher values of initial assets, x and y or the net worth ξ = x+ y, will yield
a higher expected revenue G(q, x, y). Further, for any assets (x, y) there is a unique optimal order
quantity q∗ such that q∗(x, y) = arg maxq≥0G(q, x, y).
We next define the critical values, α and β, as follows:
α = F−1(a); (10)
β = F−1(b), (11)
where
a =
p− c · (1 + `)
p− s ; b =
p− c · (1 + i)
p− s .
It is readily seen that a ≤ b, since 0 ≤ i ≤ ` by assumption. This implies that α ≤ β, since F−1(z) is
increasing in z. The critical value β can be interpreted as the optimal order quantity for the classical
firm problem corresponding to the case of sufficiently large Y of our model, in which case no loan is
involved, but the unit “price” c · (1 + i) has been inflated to reflect the opportunity cost of cash not
invested in the bank at an interest rate i. Similarly, α can be interpreted as the optimal order quantity
for the classical firm problem corresponding to the case Y = 0 of our model, i.e., all units are purchased
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by a loan at an interest rate `.
Note also that in contrast to the classical firm model, the critical values α and β above, are now functions
of the corresponding interest rates and represent opportunity costs that take into account the value of
time using the interest factors 1 + i and 1 + `.
We next provide the following theorem regarding the optimality of the (α, β) policy.
Theorem 1. For any given initial inventory-capital state (x, y), the optimal order quantity is
q∗(x, y) =

(β − x)+, β ≤ x+ y;
y+, α ≤ x+ y < β;
(α− x)+, x+ y < α,
(12)
where α and β are given by Eq. (10) and (11), respectively.
Note that the optimal ordering quantity in the classical newsvendor model [cf. Zipkin (2000) and many
others], can be obtained from Theorem 1 as the solution for the extreme case with i = ` = 0, in which
case the optimal order quantity is given by:
α = β = F−1
(
p− c
p− s
)
.
Next we elucidate the structure of the (α, β) optimal policy below where we discuss the utilization level
of the initially available capital Y .
1. Over-utilization: When x+ y < α, it is optimal to order q∗ = α − x = y + (α − x− y). In this
case y = Y/c units are bought using all the available fund Y and the remaining (α− x− y) units
are bought using a loan of size: c · (α− x− y).
2. Full-utilization: When α ≤ x+ y < β, it is optimal to order q∗ = y = Y/c with all the available
fund Y . In this case, no deposit and no loan are involved.
3. Under-utilization: When x+y ≥ β, it is optimal to order q∗ = (β−x)+. In particular, if x < β,
it is optimal to order β−x using c · (β−x) units of the available cash Y , and deposit the remaining
cash to earn interest. However, if x ≥ β, then q∗ = 0, i.e., it is optimal not to order any units and
deposit all the amount of Y to earn interest.
The above interpretation is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case x = 0, which plots the optimal order
quantity q∗ as a function of y. Note that for y ∈ (0, α) there is over utilization of y; for y ∈ [α, β) there
is full utilization of y and for y ∈ [β,∞) there is under utilization of y.
In light of aforementioned (α, β) policy, one can derive the optimal expected net worth, V (x, y) =
maxq≥0G(q, x, y) in explicit form.
Theorem 2. For the single-period problem with initial state (x, y),
i) V(x,y) is given by
V (x, y) =

p · x− (p− s) · T (x) + c · y · (1 + i), x > β;
p · β − (p− s) · T (β) + c · (x+ y − β)(1 + i), x ≤ β, β ≤ x+ y;
p · (x+ y+)− (p− s) · T (x+ y+), α ≤ x+ y < β;
p · α− (p− s) · T (α) + c · (x+ y − α)(1 + l), x+ y < α,
(13)
where T (x) =
∫ x
0
(x− t)f(t)dt;
ii) The function V (x, y) is increasing in x and y, and jointly concave in (x, y), for x, y ≥ 0.
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Figure 1: The Optimal Order Quantity when x = 0
From an investment perspective, it is of interest to consider the possibility of speculation; cf. Hull
(2002). The following result shows that the (α, β) policy given in Theorem 1 yields positive value with
zero investment. Specifically, when the firm has zero initial inventory and capital, i.e., x = 0 and y = 0,
the optimal policy yields a positive expected final asset value.
Corollary 1. For x = 0 and y = 0, one has
V (0, 0) = (p− s)
∫ α
0
t · f(t)dt > 0.
Note that arbitrage usually means that it is possible to have a positive profit for any realized demand
(i.e., of a risk-free profit at zero cost; cf. Hull (2002)), thus the above speculation possibility does not in
general imply an arbitrage, which only exists if the demand is constant.
5 Optimal Solution for the Multiple Period Problem
For ease of exposition, we shall denote ξn = xn + yn and take zn = xn + qn as the decision variable,
in lieu of qn. Here, zn refers to the available inventory after replenishment, and it is constrained by
zn ≥ xn ≥ 0 for each period n. In this fashion, the MDP model defined by Eqs. (5)-(6) can be presented
as:
Vn(xn, yn) = max
zn≥xn
Gn(zn, ξn), (14)
where Gn(zn, ξn) = E [Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)]. The inventory-capital states are dynamically updated as
xn+1 = [zn −Dn]+; (15)
yn+1 = p
′
n · zn − (p′n + h′n) [zn −Dn]+ + c′n · (ξn − zn)
[
(1 + in)1{zn≤ξn} + (1 + `n)1{zn>ξn}
]
,(16)
where p′n = pn/cn+1, h
′
n = hn/cn+1 and c
′
n = cn/cn+1.
We first present the following result.
Lemma 2. For n ∈ N , the following is true:
(1) Gn(zn, xn, yn) is increasing in xn and yn, and is concave in zn, xn and yn.
(2) Vn(xn, yn) is increasing and concave in xn and yn.
We next present and prove the main result of this section.
9
Theorem 3. (The (αn, βn) ordering policy).
For every period n ∈ N with state (xn, yn) at the beginning of the period, there exist positive constants
αn = αn(xn, yn) and βn = βn(xn, yn) with αn ≤ βn, which give rise to the optimal order quantity as
follows:
q∗n(xn, yn) =

(βn − xn)+, ξn ≥ βn;
(yn)
+, αn ≤ ξn < βn;
(αn − xn)+, ξn < αn.
(17)
Further, αn is uniquely identified by
E
[(
∂Vn+1
∂xn+1
− (p′n + h′n)
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
)
1{αn>Dn}
]
= [c′n(1 + `n)− p′n]E
[
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
]
, (18)
and βn is uniquely identified by
E
[(
∂Vn+1
∂xn+1
− (p′n + h′n)
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
)
1{βn>Dn}
]
= [c′n(1 + in)− p′n]E
[
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
]
. (19)
where the expectations are taken with respect to Dn conditionally on the initial state (xn, yn).
Theorem 3 establishes that the optimal ordering policy is characterized by two threshold variables. More
importantly, these two threshold values, αn and βn, can be obtained recursively by solving the implicit
equations, Eqs. (18) and (19), respectively.
Remark. The study in Chao et al. (2008) assumes that borrowing is not allowed, and thus the firm
is firmly limited to order at most yn units for period n. In that paper, it was shown that the optimal
policy is determined in each period by one critical value. Our results presented in Theorem 3 subsume
that study as a special case. This can be seen if we set `n to be sufficiently large such that a loan is
financially prohibited. In this case, αn becomes zero and βn can be interpreted as the critical value
developed in Chao et al. (2008).
Corollary 2. For any period n < N and its initial state (xn, yn), the threshold variables of αn and
βn are only determined by the total worth ξn = xn + yn, i.e., they are of the form: αn = αn(ξn) and
βn = βn(ξn). But for the last period N , αN and βN are independent of either xN or yN .
Not surprisingly, Corollary 2 implies that the operational decisions are affected by the firm’s current
financial status. In view of Corollary 2, one can first compute αn and βn at the beginning of the period
based on the total worth ξn. The decision on the order quantity qn can then be made via Eq. (17).
6 Myopic Policies and Bounds Analysis
As shown by Theorem 3, the computation of αn and βn is complex and costly. This fact motivates the
study to follow myopic ordering policies that are relatively simple to implement. Such myopic policies
optimize a given objective function with respect to any single period and ignore multi-period interactions
and cumulative effects. To this end, we introduce two types of myopic policies. Specifically, myopic pol-
icy (I) assumes the associated cost for the leftover inventory sn is only the holding cost, i.e., sn = −hn.
Myopic policy (II) assumes that the leftover inventory cost s¯n is not only the holding cost but it also
includes its value in the following period, i.e., sn = cn+1 − hn. In the following two subsections, we will
show that myopic policy (I) yields lower bounds, αn and βn for the two threshold values, αn and βn,
while myopic policy (II) yields upper bounds, α¯n and β¯n.
Before presenting the myopic policies, we present the following lemma that will be applied to derive the
upper and lower bounds.
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Lemma 3. For real functions f(x) and g(x),
(a) if both f(x) and g(x) are monotonically increasing or decreasing, then
E[f(X) · g(X)] ≥ E[f(X)] · E[g(X)],
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random variable X.
(b) If f(x) is increasing (decreasing), while g(x) is decreasing (increasing), then
E[f(X) · g(X)] ≤ E[f(X)] · E[g(X)].
6.1 Myopic Policy (I) and Lower Bounds for αn and βn
Myopic policy (I) is the one period optimal policy obtained when we change the periodic cost structure
by assuming that only the holding cost is assessed for any leftover inventory i.e., we assume the following
modified “salvage value” cost structure:
sn =
{ −hn, n < N,
s, n = N.
Let further,
an =
pn − cn · (1 + `n)
pn − sn
; (20)
bn =
pn − cn · (1 + in)
pn − sn
. (21)
and the corresponding critical values are respectively given by
αn = F
−1
n (an); (22)
β
n
= F−1n (bn). (23)
For n ∈ N , the order quantity below defines the myopic policy (I):
q
n
(xn, yn) =

(β
n
− xn)+, xn + yn ≥ βn;
(yn)
+, αn ≤ xn + yn < βn;
αn − xn, xn + yn < αn.
The next theorem establishes the lower bound properties of the myopic policy (I).
Theorem 4. The following are true:
i) For the last period N , αN = αN and βN = βN .
ii) For any period n = 1, 2, . . . N − 1, αn ≥ αn and βn ≥ βn.
6.2 Myopic Policy (II) and Upper Bounds for αn and βn
Myopic policy (II) is the one period optimal policy obtained when we change the periodic cost structure
by assuming that not only the holding cost is assessed but also the cost in the next period for any leftover
inventory i.e., we assume the following modified “salvage value” cost structure:
s¯n =
{
cn+1 − hn, n < N ;
s, n = N.
(24)
One can interpret the modified salvage values s¯n of Eq. (24) as representing a fictitious income from
inventory liquidation (or pre-salvage at full current cost) at the beginning of the next period n+ 1, i.e.,
it corresponds to the situation that the firm can salvage inventory at the price cn+1 at the beginning of
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the period n + 1. Note that the condition cn(1 + `n) + hn ≥ cn+1 is required if inventory liquidation
is allowed. Otherwise, the firm will stock up at an infinite level and sell them off at the beginning of
period n+ 1. Such speculation is precluded by the aforementioned condition. Let further,
a¯n =
pn − cn[1 + `n]
pn − s¯n , (25)
b¯n =
pn − cn[1 + in]
pn − s¯n . (26)
and the corresponding critical values are given by
α¯n = F
−1
n (a¯n), (27)
β¯n = F
−1
n (b¯n). (28)
For n ∈ N , the order quantity below defines the myopic policy (II):
q¯n(xn, yn) =

(β¯n − xn)+, xn + yn ≥ β¯n;
(yn)
+, α¯n ≤ xn + yn < β¯n;
α¯n − xn, xn + yn < α¯n.
Let V Ln (xn, yn) denote the optimal expected future value when the inventory liquidation option is avail-
able only at the beginning of period n + 1 (but not in the remaining periods n + 2, . . . , N) given the
initial state (xn, yn) of period n. For notational simplicity, let ξn+1 = ξn+1(xn, yn, zn, Dn) represent the
total capital and inventory asset value in period n + 1 when the firm orders zn ≥ xn in state (xn, yn)
and the demand is Dn. Note that ξn+1 = xn+1 + yn+1, where xn+1 and yn+1 are given by Eqs. (15) and
(16), respectively. Therefore, V Ln can be written as
V Ln (xn, yn) = max
zn≥xn
E [Vn+1(0, ξn+1) |xn, yn] . (29)
Note that for any real functions g(x) and f(x), with g(x) increasing and concave in x and f(x) concave
in x, the function g
(
f(x)
)
is concave in x ∈ <. Thus, the concavity of E [Vn+1(0, ξn+1) |xn, yn] in zn
follows from the observations that Vn(0, ξ) is increasing and concave in ξ (cf. part 2 of Lemma 2) and
ξn+1 is concave in in zn, since both xn+1 and yn+1 are concave in zn (cf. discussion in the proof of
Lemma 2 regarding the second order derivatives of xn+1 and yn+1 with respect to zn). Therefore, V
L
n
has an optimal policy characterized by a sequence of threshold value pairs, (αLn , β
L
n ).
Before exhibiting the upper bounds of αn and βn, we present the following result.
Proposition 1. For any period n with initial state (xn, yn),
(i) Vn(xn − d, yn + d) is increasing in d where 0 ≤ d ≤ xn.
(ii) The partial derivatives satisfy, ∂Vn(xn, yn)/∂yn ≥ ∂Vn(xn, yn)/∂xn.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 states that, for the same total asset, more capital is more profitable than more
inventory. This is true because more capital provides more flexibility of converting cash into product.
Part (ii) implies that the contribution margin of a unit of cash is higher than that of a unit of inventory.
In view of Proposition 1, we have the following results.
Proposition 2. For any state (xn, yn), and all n = 1, . . . N , the following are true:
(i) V Ln (xn, yn) ≥ Vn(xn, yn),
(ii) αLn ≥ αn and βLn ≥ βn .
Note that inventory liquidation at the beginning of period n + 1 provides the firm with additional
flexibility, since the initial inventory xn+1 can be liquidated into cash, thereby allowing the firm to holds
only ξn+1 = xn+1 + yn+1 in cash. Note further that the firm will chose to stock up to a higher level of
inventory when liquidation is allowed. Indeed, if the firm orders more in period n, all leftover inventory
after satisfying the period demand Dn can be salvaged at full cost cn+1 at the beginning of the next
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period, n+ 1. In other words, the firm will take the advantage of inventory liquidation to stock product
at a higher level than that corresponding to the case in which liquidation is not allowed in the current
period n. The advantage of doing so is twofold: (1) more demand can be satisfied leading to more
revenue, and (2) no extra cost is accrued from liquidation of leftover inventory.
The next result establishes the upper bound properties of the myopic policy (II).
Proposition 3. For any period n = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, if cn(1 + `n) + hn ≥ cn+1, then the threshold
constants of the optimal policy given in Eqs. (18)-(19) and its myopic optimal policy given in Eqs.
(27)-(28) satisfy α¯n ≥ αn and β¯n ≥ βn.
For the last period N , αN = α¯N and βN = β¯N .
6.3 An Algorithm to Compute (αn, βn)
It is generally not easy to compute solutions even for the simpler multi-period problems which involve
base-stock levels. In the supply chain literature, computational methods are often based on heuristic
algorithms or iterative search procedures. Determination of base-stock levels in each period or for each
echelon and the minimization of the total supply chain cost are notoriously complex and computationally
tedious, especially for our underlying two-dimensional state space with the attending curse of dimen-
sionality; cf. Lee and Billington (1993), Chen and Zheng (1994), Minner (1997), Shang and Song (2003)
and Daniel and Rajendran (2006).
Nevertheless, with the aid of the lower and the upper bounds developed in §6.1 and §6.2, respectively,
we develop an efficient algorithm for the problem herein, using bisection. In view of Theorem 3, for each
period n ∈ N we aim to find the roots of φ(αn) = 0 and ψ(βn) = 0, where
φ(αn) := E
[(
∂Vn+1
∂xn+1
− (p′n + h′n)
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
)
1{αn>Dn}
]
− [c′n(1 + `n)− p′n]E
[
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
]
, (30)
is the first-order derivative of Gn(zn, xn, yn) w.r.t. zn at zn = αn for a period in which the firm took a
loan; and
ψn(βn) := E
[(
∂Vn+1
∂xn+1
− (p′n + h′n)
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
)
1{βn>Dn}
]
− [c′n(1 + in)− p′n]E
[
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
]
. (31)
is the first-order derivative of Gn(zn, xn, yn) w.r.t. zn at zn = βn for a period in which the firm made a
deposit.
Threshold Computation Algorithm:
STEP 0 Determine and discretize the state space of elements x ∈ X and y ∈ Y;
Specify the tolerance  > 0;
STEP 1 For the last period n = N and ∀(x, y) ∈ X× Y, compute VN (x, y) using Eq. (13);
STEP 2 Set the period index n← n− 1;
Compute αn and βn using Eqs. (22)-(23);
Compute α¯n and β¯n using Eqs. (27)-(28);
STEP 3(a) To compute αn: Set a← αn, b← α¯n;
While b− a > 
Set c← (a+ b)/2
If φn(c) = 0 or (b− a)/2 < 
Display “solution found”; Output(αn = c); Stop
End If
If φn(c) > 0, then a← c; else b← c.
End While; go to STEP 3(b) to compute βn.
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STEP 3(b) To compute βn: Set a← β
n
, b← β¯n;
While b− a > 
Set c← (a+ b)/2
If ψn(c) = 0 or (b− a)/2 < 
Display “solution found”; Output(βn = c); Stop
End If
If ψn(c) > 0, then a← c; else b← c.
End While; go to STEP 4.
STEP 4 Compute the optimal order quantity using Eq. (17) for each state;
Compute Vn(xn, yn) by substituting q
∗
n(xn, yn) into E [Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)];
If n > 1, go back to STEP 2; Otherwise END.
We now discuss briefly the complexity of the bisection search algorithm above. This method is guaranteed
to converge to the roots of φn(αn) and ψn(βn), since φn(αn) ≥ 0 while φn(α¯n) ≤ 0; and ψn(βn) ≥ 0
while ψn(β¯n) ≤ 0. Specifically, if ck is the midpoint of the interval in the k-th iteration of STEP
3, then the difference between ck and a solution c, i.e., αn or βn, is bounded by |ck − c| ≤ b− a
2n
.
Therefore, the number of iterations k to attain a predetermined error (or tolerance)  is given by,
k = log2
(
0

)
= log 0−log log 2 , where 0 is the range of bounds; viz. 0 = α¯n − αn for computing αn, and
0 = β¯n − βn for computing βn.
6.4 Selling Back to the Supplier: Upper Bound for the Value Function
Vn(x, y)
The myopic policies above provide lower and upper bounds for αn and βn, respectively, and both of
them provide lower bounds for the value function Vn(x, y). In this section we obtain upper bounds for
the value function by considering a related problem in which the firm is given the option to sell unneeded
inventory back to the supplier at full price. Thus, for some cases, the firm has more flexibility at the
beginning of a period n ∈ N to readjust the inventory level as compared to just ordering from the
supplier at cost cn. For example, the firm is allowed to sell unneeded inventory back to the supplier or
at a free-trading spot market at price cn. We assume cn+1 ≤ cn + hn to preclude situations that the
firm can profit from selling product in inventory back to the supplier.
In practice this situation occurs either when there is an agreement between the supplier and the firm
such as a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) contract, or there is a commodity spot market, e.g., energy
sources and natural resources; cf. Secomandi (2010). We will refer to such a setting as a selling back
option. The selling back provides the firm with the flexibility to liquidate any excess inventory into cash
prior to the regular selling season. This technically reduces the state of the system from two variables,
xn and yn, to a single variable ξn that represents the sum of the cash value of the on-hand inventory
plus the cash value, expressed in product units, i.e., ξn = xn + yn.
Adding Eqs. (15) and (16) yields the dynamics equations for ξn+1 = xn+1 + yn+1, with the decision
variables zn,
ξn+1 = p
′
n · zn − (p′n + h′n − 1) [zn −Dn]+ + c′n · (ξn − zn)
[
(1 + in)1{zn≤ξn} + (1 + `n)1{zn>ξn}
]
. (32)
The dynamic programming equations for the value function V Sn (ξn) are
V Sn (ξn) = max
zn≥0
E[V Sn+1(ξn+1)], (33)
where the terminal value V SN (ξN ) = VN (0, ξN ) is given by Eq. (6).
It is straightforward to show that V Sn (ξ) is increasing and concave in ξ for any n ∈ N . Consequently,
we have the following result.
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Theorem 5. (Optimal inventory-trading policy with selling back).
At the beginning of period n ∈ N , if the firm has a selling back option, then
(i) The optimal policy is (αSn, β
S
n ) policy, where 0 ≤ αSn < βSn . That is, the optimal target inventory is
z∗n(ξn) =

βSn , ξn ≥ βSn ;
ξn, α
S
n ≤ ξn < βSn ;
αSn , ξn < α
S
n.
(ii) For any xn and yn, the value functions satisfy
V Sn (xn + yn) ≥ V Ln (xn, yn) ≥ Vn(xn, yn).
Theorem 5 states that, with the selling back option, the firm can freely reposition its inventory via
selling down or ordering up as follows. If ξn ≥ βSn , then it is optimal to choose the target inventory zn
equal to βSn ; if ξn ≤ αSn , then it is optimal to choose the target inventory zn as αSn ; and otherwise, if
αSn < ξn < β
S
n , then it is optimal to choose the target inventory zn equal to ξn.
Note that V Sn provides an upper bound for Vn which is easier to compute than that of Vn(x, y), since
the former is a function of only one variable.
7 Numerical Studies
In this section, we present numerical studies to glean further insights into the interplay between cash flow
and inventory flow. To this end, we fix the following parameters across periods: the selling price p = 2000;
the ordering cost c = 1000; the holding cost h = 500; the deposit interest rate r = 1%; and the loan
interest rate ` = 15%. The salvage value s = 600. In the sequel, Subsection 7.1 considers the impacts of
time horizon and initial states on the optimal solution; Subsection 7.2 studies the corresponding impact
of various demand distributions, and Subsection 7.3 investigates the performance of the lower and upper
bounds of the value function.
7.1 Impact of Time Horizon
We assume that the demand is uniformly distributed as D ∼ U [0, 20] and select N = 3 and N = 6 as
time horizions. The solution V1(x, y), is generally obtained by backward induction using the numer-
ical algorithm as presented in §6.3, and to emphasize the dependence of V1(x, y) on N we will write
V1:N (x, y). Figure 2 depicts the resultant optimal functions V1:N (x, y) for the two selected time horizons
and states (x, y) with x ranging from 0 to 20 and y ranging from -50 to 50.
Observe first that V1:N (x, y) in Figure 2 is increasing and jointly concave in x and y. This observation
comports with Lemma 2.
Further, the top-right of Figure 2 shows that V1:N (x, y) is increasing in N for large values of x and/or
y; however, the far bottom-left of that figure shows that for sufficiently small x and/or y, V1:N (x, y) is
decreasing in N . For cases of sufficiently large or small y, the optimal value is primarily determined by
financial decisions as apposed to operational ones, e.g., there is a large cost due to loans for sufficiently
negative y, and consequently, V1:6(x, y) is smaller than V1:3(x, y). The opposite is true for sufficiently
large y. Conversely, the middle segment of that figure shows that for non-extreme values in the range of x
and y, the operational decisions play a more important role than the financial ones, yielding significantly
larger magnitudes of V1:N (x, y) over the time horizon N . The dominant role of operational decisions is
supported by the observation that the rate of increase of V1:N (x, y) in y is increasing in N .
7.2 Impact of Demand Distributions
In the sequel, we fixed the time horizon as N = 6. To study the impact of demand distributions, we first
consider various uniform demand distributions with the same mean but different variance. Figures 3 and
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4 depict V1(x, 0) and V1(0, y) respectively for D ∼ U [0, 20] , D ∼ U [2, 18], D ∼ U [4, 16] and D ∼ U [6, 14].
Both figures show concavity for each demand type. Given the common mean, the demand variance has
a significant impact on the value function. For example, there is roughly 5,000 reduction from the case
of D ∼ U [6, 14] to the case of D ∼ U [4, 16] for any x or y in each figure.
We next consider the impact of different types of demand distributions in addition to the uniform
distribution. The Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) distribution is a useful generalization of the Poisson
distribution; cf Lambert (1992). The ZIP distribution with parameters pi ∈ [0, 1) and λ ≥ 0 has the
following probability mass function: P(X = 0) = pi + (1 − pi)e−λ and P(X = k) = (1 − pi)e−λλk/k! for
k = 1, 2, 3 . . .. Hence, its mean µX = λ(1 − pi) and its standard deviation σX =
√
λ(1− pi)(1 + λpi).
Therefore, its coefficient of variation (defined as the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean)
is c.v. =
√
1+λpi
λ(1−pi) .
Figure 5 compares the optimal V1(x, y) with D ∼ ZIP(0.18, 10) and D ∼ U [0, 20], both of which have
the same c.v. = 0.58. It shows that the uniform demand yields higher V1(x, y) than the ZIP demand
for any x and y. This can be explained by the mean of the uniform demand (µ = 10) being larger than
that of the ZIP demand (µ = 8.2), even though they have the same c.v.
Figure 2: Function V1(x, y) for N = 6 and N = 3
with D ∼ U [0, 20]
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Figure 3: Function V1(x, 0) for N = 6 with Se-
lected Uniform Demand Distributions
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Figure 5: V1(x, y) for N = 6: Uniform v.s. ZIP
Demand Distributions
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Table 1 displays the the optimal objective function values and the performances of myopic policies (I)
and (II), in terms of uniform and ZIP demands with respect to different c.v. levels. In the table, for
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x1 = y1 = 0, V1 := V1(0, 0), V
(X )
1 is the expected wealth under myopic policy (X ), X ∈ {I, II}, and
the performance gap percentage ∆(X )% := (V1 − V (X )1 )/V1 × 100%. First, as c.v. decreases, the value
of V1(0, 0) increases significantly for each type of demands. Second, under the uniform demand, myopic
policy (II) with ∆(II)% < 0.2% performs significantly better than myopic policy (I) with ∆(I)% > 3.5%;
but the converse is observed under the ZIP demand. For the same c.v. value, ZIP demand has lower V1
than Uniform demand; this can be explained by the smaller mean of ZIP demand, and the significantly
higher probability of zero demand, e.g., when c.v. = 0.46, P(D = 0) = 9% for ZIP demand, but
P(D = 0) = 0% for the Uniform demand. Finally, note that for the last row in Table 1, ZIP(0, 10)
is the standard Poisson distribution with mean λ = 10 - the same mean as D ∼ U(6, 14). However,
ZIP(0, 10) has a smaller V1, because it has a larger standard deviation, and hence a higher c.v. value.
Table 1: The Optimal v.s. Myopic Policies: Uniform and ZIP Demand with Various c.v. (x1 = y1 = 0
and N = 6)
D ∼ U [a, b] D ∼ ZIP(pi, λ)
Optimal Myopic I Myopic II Optimal Myopic I Myopic II
c.v. [a, b] V1 V
(I)
1 ∆
(I)% V
(II)
1 ∆
(II)% c.v. (pi, λ) V1 V
(I)
1 ∆
(I)% V
(II)
1 ∆
(II)%
0.58 [0, 20] 35074 30271 13.69% 35016 0.16% 0.58 (0.18, 10) 23130 22800 1.43% 21757 5.94%
0.46 [2,18] 40174 36784 8.44% 40158 0.04% 0.45 (0.09, 10) 26920 26910 0.04% 26142 2.89%
0.35 [4,16] 44950 42329 5.83% 44886 0.14% 0.35 (0.02, 10) 29612 29484 0.43% 29115 1.68%
0.23 [6,14] 49428 47677 3.54% 49385 0.09% 0.31 (0, 10) 30355 30288 0.22% 29911 1.46%
Figure 6: V S1 (ξ) v.s. V1(0, y) and V1(x, 0) for
N = 6 with D ∼ U [0, 20]
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7.3 Upper and Lower Bounds of the Value Function
As discussed in §6, we know that each of the myopic policies provides a lower bound for the value
function, hence we can take the larger one as the better lower bound. Furthermore, V S1 provides an
upper bound. In what follows, we numerically examine their approximating performance with the same
parameters as the ones selected in the previous numerical studies.
Figure 6 compares V S1 (ξ) with V1(ξ, 0) and V1(0, ξ) for N = 6. First, for any ξ, it is shown that
V S1 (ξ) ≥ V1(0, ξ) ≥ V1(ξ, 0). Second, the difference between V S1 (ξ) and V1(0, ξ) is almost imperceptible
which implies that the upper bound is fairly tight for the state of high capital level y (or low product
level x). Further, the bound gap between V S1 (ξ) and V1(ξ, 0) gets larger as ξ increases.
Figure 7 depicts the effect of N on V S1:N (ξ), for N = 1, 2, 4, 6. Observe that for any N , V
S
1:N (ξ) is
increasing and jointly concave in ξ. Further, referring to the top-right of Figure 7, V S1:N (ξ) is increasing
in N for large values of ξ, e.g., ξ > 10; however, referring to the far bottom-left of the figure, V S1:N (ξ) is
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decreasing in N for sufficiently small ξ, e.g., ξ < −30. Finally, we conclude that operational decisions
plays a more important role than the financial decision for the middle range of ξ, e.g., ξ ∈ (−30, 10),
since the slope at each N in the interval is significantly larger than elsewhere, and gets larger as N
increases.
Table 2 exhibits the optimal value function (Opt.) and its lower and upper bounds for D ∼ U [0, 20] and
D ∼ U [6, 14], N = 6, 12 and selected product level state x = 0, 7, 14. In this case, the lower bound
is obtained from myopic policy (II) since it performs better than myopic policy (I). First, each bound
provides a fairly tight approximation for the optimal value with ∆(X )% less than 1%. Second, as c.v.
of demand distribution decreases from U [0, 20] to U [6, 14], the optimal value function and its lower and
upper bounds increase, due to the reduced volatility of the demand. Further, the lower bound gap ∆(II)
gets smaller, while this change is not evident for its upper bound gap ∆S . Third, for each N and each
demand distribution, as x increases, the bound gap ∆S gets larger, whereas this behavior is not evident
for ∆(II). Finally, as the time horizon N gets longer, the optimal value function and its lower and upper
bounds get larger, and the bound gap ∆(X ) gets larger as well for both bounds X ∈ {II, S}. However,
the change of the corresponding gap percentage ∆(X )% is not evident.
Table 2: The Lower and Upper Bounds for the Value Function V1(x, 0)
D ∼ U [0, 20] D ∼ U [6, 14]
Opt. LowerBound UpperBound Opt. LowerBound UpperBound
N x V1 V
(II)
1 ∆
(II) ∆(II)% V S1 ∆
S ∆S% V1 V
(II)
1 ∆
(II) ∆(II)% V S1 ∆
S ∆S%
6
0 35074 35016 58 0.16% 35080 -6 -0.02% 49428 49386 43 0.09% 49428 0 0.00%
7 45542 45435 107 0.24% 45550 -9 -0.02% 58575 58536 39 0.07% 58575 0 0.00%
14 54248 54200 48 0.09% 54355 -107 -0.20% 66076 66036 40 0.06% 66634 -558 -0.84%
12
0 75888 75693 194 0.26% 75923 -36 -0.05% 103872 103760 112 0.11% 103872 0 0.00%
7 87273 87057 216 0.25% 87290 -18 -0.02% 113564 113464 100 0.09% 113564 0 0.00%
14 96528 96410 118 0.12% 96660 -132 -0.14% 121521 121419 102 0.08% 122114 -592 -0.49%
8 Model Extensions
In this section, we study three extensions of the basic model. The first extension is a piecewise linear
structure of the interest rate functions for both loans and deposits, the second is the existence of a
maximum loan limit and the third is backorder of unmet demand.
8.1 Piecewise Type of Loan and Deposit Functions
So far, the loan function was assumed to be a linear function: L(x) = (1 + `) · x with a constant loan
rate `. However, L(x) can have a more complex form in practice. In this section we investigate the often
occurring case in which L(x) is a piecewise linear function, i.e., it has the form,
L(x) = (1 + `(m)) · x, x ∈ (x(m−1), x(m)],
where x(m−1) < x(m), x(0) = 0 and `(m) < `(m+1) for m = 1, 2, 3, ....
Similarly, we consider the deposit interest function to be a piecewise linear function of the form,
M(y) = (1 + i(k)) · y, y ∈ (y(k−1), y(k)],
where y(k−1) < y(k), y(0) = 0 and i(k) ≤ i(k+1) for k = 1, 2, 3, ....
Without loss of generality, we assume that the loan interest rates are always greater than the deposit
interest rates, that is i¯ < `(1) where i¯ = supk{i(k)}.
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Before characterizing the optimal ordering policy, we introduce the threshold values of α(m) and β(k) for
m, k = 1, 2, 3, ... as follows
α(m) = F−1(a(m)); (34)
β(k) = F−1(b(k)), (35)
where
a(m) =
p− c · (1 + `(m))
p− s ; b
(k) =
p− c · (1 + i(k))
p− s .
It is straightforward to see that
β(1) ≥ · · ·β(k) ≥ β(k+1) · · · ≥ β¯ > α(1) ≥ · · ·α(m) ≥ α(m+1) · · · ≥ 0,
where β¯ = F−(
p− c · (1 + i¯)
p− s ). We present the structure of the optimal ordering policy in Theorem 6
below.
Theorem 6. For any given initial inventory-capital state (x, y), the optimal order quantity is
q∗(x, y) =

(β(k) − x)+, β(k+1) ≤ x+ y ≤ β(k);
· · · , · · ·
(y)+, α(1) ≤ x+ y < β¯;
· · · , · · ·
(α(m) − x)+, α(m+1) ≤ x+ y < α(m),
where {α(m)} and {β(k)} are given by Eqs. (34) and (35), respectively.
For the multi-period problem, the optimal order quantity for each period has a structure similar to that
of its single period counerpart, and the proof is analogous to that of Theorem 6. We shall note that for
period n < N , the threshold values, α
(m)
n and β
(k)
n , are determined by ξn. However, for the last period
N , the threshold values, α
(m)
N and β
(k)
N , are independent of the initial state xN and yN , or ξN . We shall
mention that if the lender charges a high loan rate such that p ≤ c · (1 + `(m)) for loan amount larger
than x(m−1), then α(m) = 0 via Eq. (34), since a(m) is nonpositive. In view of Theorem 6, if the total
asset x+ y < 0, then the firm will not order via a loan.
8.2 Financing Subject to a Maximum Loan Limit Constraint
In practice, the outstanding loan amount is often restricted not to exceed a maximum limit. Let Ln > 0
denote the maximum loan limit for period n; hence the maximum loan can finance finance L′n := Ln/cn
units of the product. In this case, we have the following structural results for the optimal ordering policy.
Theorem 7. (Optimal ordering policy under a maximum loan limit).
For period n ∈ N with given state (xn, yn) at the beginning of the period, if there is a loan limit Ln,
then there exist positive constants αLn = α
L
n(ξn) and β
L
n = β
L
n (ξn) with α
L
n ≤ βLn , which characterize the
optimal order quantity as follows:
q∗(xn, yn) =

(βLn − xn)+, xn + yn ≥ βLn ;
(yn)
+, αLn ≤ xn + yn < βLn ;
(αLn − xn)+, αLn − L′n ≤ xn + yn < αLn ;
L′n, xn + yn < α
L
n − L′n.
Note that for period n, the inequality αLn < L
′
n is admissible. In this case, the maximum loan limit is
not binding since the optimal order quantity satisfies q∗n ≤ αLn < L′n.
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8.3 Backorder System
Recall that our basic model assumes the lost-sale rule for unmet demand. This section considers the
case in which backorders are allowed and shows that an ordering policy of the same (αn, βn) structure
is optimal.
Suppose that any unmet demand is backlogged subject to bn penalty cost per unit of unmet demand. Let
V˜n(x, y) denote the optimal expected profit function of period n for given initial state (x, y). Accordingly,
we have the following dynamic programming formulation:
V˜n(xn, yn) = sup
zn≥xn
E
[
V˜n+1(xn+1, yn+1)|xn, yn
]
, n = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1 (36)
where the expectation is taken with respect to Dn, and xn+1, yn+1 are respectively given by
xn+1 = zn −Dn; (37)
yn+1 = [R˜n(Dn, zn) + K˜n(zn, ξn)]/cn+1, (38)
and
R˜n(Dn, zn) = (pn + bn) · zn − (pn + hn + bn) [zn −Dn]+ − bnE[Dn]; (39)
K˜n(zn, ξn) = cn · (ξn − zn)
[
(1 + in)1{zn≤ξn} + (1 + `n)1{zn>ξn}
]
. (40)
For the terminal period N, V˜N (xN , yN ) = supqN≥0 E
[
R˜N (DN , zN ) + K˜N (zN , ξN )
]
, where hN = −s.
Theorem 8. Under the backorder rule, for any period n ∈ N with initial state (xn, yn), there exist
positive constants αn = αn(ξn) and βn = βn(ξn) satisfying αn ≤ βn, which characterize the optimal
order quantity as follows:
q˜∗(xn, yn) =
 (βn − xn)
+, xn + yn ≥ βn;
(yn)
+, αn ≤ xn + yn < βn;
(αn − xn)+, xn + yn < αn.
(41)
Further, αn is uniquely identified by
E
[(
∂V˜n+1
∂xn+1
− (p′n + h′n)
∂V˜n+1
∂yn+1
)
1{αn>Dn}
]
= [c′n(1 + `n)− p′n]E
[
∂V˜n+1
∂yn+1
]
, (42)
and βn is uniquely identified by
E
[(
∂V˜n+1
∂xn+1
− (p′n + h′n)
∂V˜n+1
∂yn+1
)
1{βn>Dn}
]
= [c′n(1 + in)− p′n]E
[
∂V˜n+1
∂yn+1
]
. (43)
where the expectations are taken with respect to Dn conditionally on the initial state (xn, yn).
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied the optimal operational-financial policy for a single-item inventory system
that adimitted both interest-bearing loans and interest-earning deposits. We showed that the optimal
ordering policy, called (αn, βn)-policy, for each period is characterized by two threshold variables. we
presented two myopic policies which provided each a lower and upper bound for the threshold variables.
The two bounds were then employed to develop an algorithm to compute the two threshold values,
αn and βn. The two myopic policies provided lower bounds of the value function. However, we further
introduced an upper bound for the value function via assuming that the firm can sell unneeded inventory
back to the supplier.
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The results of this paper directly suggest several directions for further research. These include i) addition
of a fixed ordering cost and/or a fixed financial transaction cost; ii) addition of a fixed system operating
cost proportional to the elapsed time; and iii) incorporation of bankruptcy risk. Our study assumes risk
neutral decision making. It would be of interest to analyze the risk-induced performance of the system,
e.g., credit rollover risk and bankruptcy probabilities; cf. Babich et al. (2012), Gong et al. (2014) and
Li et al. (2013).
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10 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The continuity follows immediately from Eq. (7). We next prove the concavity via
examining its first-order and second-order derivatives. To this end, differentiating Eq. (7) via Leibniz’s
integral rule yields
∂
∂q
G(q, x, y) =
{
p− c · (1 + i)− (p− s)F (q + x) if q < y,
p− c · (1 + `)− (p− s)F (q + x) if q > y.
(44)
Therefore, for q > y or q < y
∂2
∂q2
G(q, x, y) = −(p− s)f(q + x). (45)
The concavity in q now readily follows since ∂
2
∂q2G(q, x, y) ≤ 0 by Eq. (45).
Although the value function is not first order and/or second order differentiable at certain points (e.g.,
at q = y), we can still consider its derivatives to show its increasing or decreasing properties, which
allows us to study the optimal solution. Such consideration will be used throughout the paper.
The increasing property of G(q, x, y) in x and y can be shown by taking the first order derivatives
∂
∂x
G(q, x, y) = pF¯ (q + x) + sF (q + x) > 0, (46)
∂
∂y
G(q, x, y) = c · [(1 + i)1{q<y} + (1 + `)1{q>y}] > 0.
The joint concavity of G(q, x, y) in x and y can be established by computing the second order derivatives
below using again Eq. (7).
∂2
∂x2
G(q, x, y) = −(p− s)f(q + x) < 0,
∂2
∂y2
G(q, x, y) = 0,
∂2
∂x∂y
G(q, x, y) = 0.
Thus the Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite and the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 2 . Part (i) follows by substituting q∗ given by Eq. (12) into Eq. (7).
For part (ii) the increasing property of V can be readily justified. To show the concavity of V , note that
by Lemma 1, G(q, x, y) is concave in q, x and y. Maximizing G over q and using Proposition A.3.10 of
Zipkin (2000), p. 436, we have that the concavity in x and y is preserved and the proof is complete.
Proof of Corollary 1. The result follows readily by setting x = y = 0 in Eq. (13).
s s s
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q
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Figure 8: Functional Structure for the Derivative of G(q, x, y) with Respective to q
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Proof of Lemma 2. We prove the result by backward induction. In particular, in each iteration, we
will prove properties (1) and (2) by recursively repeating two steps: deducing the property of Gn from
the property of Vn+1 and obtaining the property of Vn from the property of Gn. Throughout the proof,
for a matrix or a vector w, we denote its transpose by wT . The Hessian Matrix (if exists) of a function
G = G(x, y) will be denoted by H G (x, y). For example, the Hessian Matrix of Vn+1 (xn+1, yn+1) is
denoted by
H Vn+1 =
[
∂2Vn+1
∂xn+1∂xn+1
∂2Vn+1
∂xn+1∂yn+1
∂2Vn+1
∂yn+1∂xn+1
∂2Vn+1
∂yn+1∂yn+1
]
(47)
1). For VN , we have a one period problem. In this case, the result for function GN (zN , xN , yN ) is
obtained by Lemma 1 with zn = xn + qn and the result for VN (xN , yN ) is given by Theorem 2 of the
single period problem.
2). For n = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, we prove the results recursively via the following two steps:
Step 1. We show that Gn(zn, xn, yn) is increasing in yn and concave in zn, xn and yn if Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
is increasing in yn+1 and concave in xn+1 and yn+1.
We first compute the partial derivatives that will be used in the sequel for any given zn. By Eq. (15),
we have:
∂xn+1
∂zn
=
∂xn+1
∂xn
= 1{zn>Dn}, (48)
∂xn+1
∂yn
= 0. (49)
Similarly, from Eq. (16) we obtain:
∂yn+1
∂zn
= p′n1{zn<Dn} − h′n1{zn>Dn} − c′n
[
(1 + in)1{zn<xn+yn} + (1 + `n)1{zn>xn+yn}
]
; (50)
∂yn+1
∂xn
= p′n1{zn<Dn} − h′n1{zn>Dn}; (51)
∂yn+1
∂yn
= c′n
[
(1 + in)1{zn<xn+yn} + (1 + `n)1{zn>xn+yn}
]
. (52)
From Eqs. (48)-(52), it readily follows that the second order derivatives of xn+1 and yn+1 with respect
to zn, xn and yn are all zero. In the sequel we interchange differentiation and integration in several
places, which can be justified by the Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem; cf. Bartle (1995).
The increasing property of function Gn(zn, xn, yn) in yn can be established by taking the first order
derivative of Eq. (7) with respect to yn. Then, we have
∂
∂yn
Gn(zn, xn, yn) = E
[
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂xn+1
∂xn+1
∂yn
+
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂yn+1
∂yn+1
∂yn
]
= E
[
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂yn+1
∂yn+1
∂yn
]
≥ 0,
where the second equality holds since ∂xn+1/∂yn = 0, by Eq. (49), and the inequality holds by Eq. (52)
and the induction hypothesis that Vn+1 is increasing in yn+1.
To prove the concavity of Gn(zn, xn, yn) in zn, xn and yn, we compute its Hessian matrix and show that
it is negative semi-definite. To this end, we compute the first order partial derivatives of Vn+1 as,
∂Gn
∂zn
= E
[
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂xn+1
∂xn+1
∂zn
+
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂yn+1
∂yn+1
∂zn
]
; (53)
∂Gn
∂xn
= E
[
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂xn+1
∂xn+1
∂xn
+
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂yn+1
∂yn+1
∂xn
]
; (54)
∂Gn
∂yn
= E
[
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂xn+1
∂xn+1
∂yn
+
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂yn+1
∂yn+1
∂yn
]
, (55)
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and consequently the second order derivatives as
∂2Gn
∂zn∂zn
= E
[[
∂xn+1
∂zn
,
∂yn+1
∂zn
]
·H Vn+1 ·
[
∂xn+1
∂zn
,
∂yn+1
∂zn
]T]
;
∂2Gn
∂zn∂xn
= E
[[
∂xn+1
∂zn
,
∂yn+1
∂zn
]
·H Vn+1 ·
[
∂xn+1
∂xn
,
∂yn+1
∂xn
]T]
;
∂2Gn
∂zn∂yn
= E
[[
∂xn+1
∂zn
,
∂yn+1
∂zn
]
·H Vn+1 ·
[
∂xn+1
∂yn
,
∂yn+1
∂yn
]T]
;
∂2Gn
∂xn∂xn
= E
[[
∂xn+1
∂xn
,
∂yn+1
∂xn
]
·H Vn+1 ·
[
∂xn+1
∂xn
,
∂yn+1
∂xn
]T]
;
∂2Gn
∂xn∂yn
= E
[[
∂xn+1
∂xn
,
∂yn+1
∂xn
]
·H Vn+1 ·
[
∂xn+1
∂yn
,
∂yn+1
∂yn
]T]
;
∂2Gn
∂yn∂yn
= E
[[
∂xn+1
∂yn
,
∂yn+1
∂yn
]
·H Vn+1 ·
[
∂xn+1
∂yn
,
∂yn+1
∂yn
]T]
,
where, by Eqs. (48) - (52), the terms involved with the second order derivatives of xn+1 and yn+1 with
respect to xn and yn have vanished and where the Hessian matrix H Vn+1 is given by Eq. (47). Thus,
the Hessian matrix of Gn is:
H Gn (zn, xn, yn) =

∂2Gn
∂zn∂zn
∂2Gn
∂zn∂xn
∂2Gn
∂zn∂yn
∂2Gn
∂xn∂zn
∂2Gn
∂xn∂xn
∂2Gn
∂xn∂yn
∂2Gn
∂yn∂zn
∂2Gn
∂yn∂xn
∂2Gn
∂yn∂yn
 , (56)
with its elements as given above. To prove it is negative semi-definite, we consider the quadratic function
below for any real w1, w2 and w3,
[w1, w2, w3] ·H Gn · [w1, w2, w3]T = E
[
~v ·H Vn+1 · ~vT ] , (57)
where ~v = w1
[
∂xn+1
∂zn
, ∂yn+1∂zn
]
+w2
[
∂xn+1
∂xn
, ∂yn+1∂xn
]
+w3
[
∂xn+1
∂yn
, ∂yn+1∂yn
]
. Since by the induction hypothesis
H Vn+1 is negative semi-definite, we have for any w1, w2 and w3
~v ·H Vn+1 · ~vT ≤ 0
and this implies that the left side of Eq. (57) is non-positive. Thus, the proof for Step 1 is complete.
Step 2. We show that Vn(xn, yn) is concave in (xn, yn) if Gn(zn, xn, yn) is concave.
Since Gn(zn, xn, yn) is concave in zn and xn and yn, Vn(xn, yn) = maxzn≥xn Gn(zn, xn, yn) is concave
in xn, yn by the fact that concavity is reserved under maximization; cf. Proposition A.3.10 in Zipkin
(2000).
Finally, the induction proof is complete with steps 1 and 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. Given state (xn, yn) at the beginning of period n ∈ N , we consider,
∂
∂zn
Gn(zn, xn, yn) = 0, (58)
where ∂Gn(zn, xn, yn)/∂zn is given by Eq. (53). Substituting Eqs. (48) and (50) into Eq. (53) we
consider the following cases:
(1) for zn ≤ xn + yn,
∂Gn
∂zn
= E
[
∂Vn+1
∂xn+1
1{zn>Dn} +
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
(
p′n1{zn<Dn} − h′n1{zn>Dn} − c′n(1 + in)
) ∣∣xn, yn] ; (59)
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(2) for zn > xn + yn,
∂Gn
∂zn
= E
[
∂Vn+1
∂xn+1
1{zn>Dn} +
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
(
p′n1{zn<Dn} − h′n1{zn>Dn} − c′n(1 + `n)
) ∣∣xn, yn] , (60)
where for each case above, the random variables xn+1 and yn+1 within the expectations are given by
Eqs. (15) and (16), respectively.
The results follow readily by setting the right sides of Eqs. (59) and (60) equal to zero and simple
manipulations. Note that ∂Gn(zn, xn, yn)/∂zn is monotonically decreasing in zn due to its concavity,
shown in part (1) of Lemma 2. Consequently, there are unique solutions to each of these equations.
Proof Corollary 2. For period N , the independence of xN or yN is obvious since this is a single period.
For period n < N , revisit Eqs. (59) and (60). Note that xn+1 is independent of (xn, yn) by Eq. (15)
while yn+1 is dependent of xn + yn by Eq. (16). Therefore, αn and βn implicitly given by Eqs. (59) and
(60) are dependent on ξn = xn + yn only, and thus completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. To prove (a), we only give the proof for the case of increasing f(x) and g(x). The
same argument can be applied for the case of decreasing f(x) and g(x).
Let X ′ be another random variable which is i.i.d. of X. Since f(x) and g(x) are increasing, we always
have [f(X)− f(X ′)][g(X)− g(X ′)] ≥ 0. Taking expectations with respect to X and X ′ yields
E
[
[f(X)− f(X ′)][g(X)− g(X ′)]]
= E[f(X)g(X) + f(X ′)g(X ′)− f(X ′)g(X)− f(X)g(X ′)]
= E[f(X)g(X)] + E[f(X ′)g(X ′)]− E[f(X ′)]E[g(X)]− E[f(X)]E[g(X ′)]
= 2E[f(X)g(X)]− 2E[f(X)]E[g(X)] ≥ 0.
The result of part (a) readily follows from the above.
In a similar vein, we can prove part (b) via changing the direction of the inequality above.
Proof of Theorem 4. We only prove the result for αn. The same argument can be applied to prove
the result for βn.
In view of Eq. (59), αn is the unique solution of the equation below,
E
[
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
(
p′n1{αn<Dn} − h′n1{αn>Dn} − c′n(1 + `n)
)]
= −E
[
∂Vn+1
∂xn+1
1{αn>Dn}
]
. (61)
Since ∂Vn+1∂xn+1 ≥ 0 by Lemma 2 part (2), the equation above is negative, which implies
E
[
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
(
p′n1{αn<Dn} − h′n1{αn>Dn} − c′n(1 + `n)
)] ≤ 0. (62)
Further note that for any realization of demand Dn = d > 0, the two terms of the left hand side of Eq.
(62):
∂Vn+1(xn+1(d), yn+1(d))
∂yn+1(d)
and p′n1{αn<d}−h′n1{αn>d}−c′n(1+`n) are both increasing in d. Specifically, the first term is increasing
by the concavity of Vn+1 [cf. Lemma 2, part (2)] and Eq. (16). Then, by Lemma 3 and Eq. (62), one
has,
E
[
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
]
E
[
p′n1{αn<Dn} − h′n1{αn>Dn} − c′n(1 + `n)
] ≤ 0 (63)
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Since ∂Vn+1∂yn+1 ≥ 0 by Lemma 2 part (2), the above inequality implies
E
[
pn1{αn<Dn} − hn1{αn>Dn} − cn(1 + `n)
] ≤ 0,
which, after simple algebra, is equivalent to pn − cn · (1 + `n)− (pn − sn)Fn(αn) ≤ 0. The above further
simplifies to
F (αn) ≥ pn − cn · (1 + `n)
pn − sn .
By Eqs. (20) and (22), the right hand side in the above inequality is Fn(αn). Thus, we have Fn(αn) ≥
Fn(αn), which completes the proof for αn ≥ αn by the increasing property of Fn(·).
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove part (i), it suffices to prove that Vn(xn, yn) ≤ Vn(xn − d, yn + d)
for arbitrarily small d > 0. To this end, consider the initial state (xn − d, yn + d). Then, the firm can
always purchase d units without any additional cost to reset the initial state to be (xn, yn). This means
Vn(xn, yn) ≤ Vn(xn − d, yn + d).
The proof for part (ii) follows from part (i). Considering the derivative of Vn(xn−d, yn+d) with respect
to d, we have
lim
d→0
Vn(x− d, y + d)− Vn(x, y)
d
= −∂Vn(x, y)/∂x+ ∂Vn(x, y)/∂y ≥ 0
where the inequality follows from part (i). Finally, part (ii) readily follows by rearranging the above
equation.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove Part (i), we note that:
V Ln (xn, yn) = max
zn≥xn
E [Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)] ≤ E [Vn+1(0, xn+1 + yn+1)] = V Ln (xn, yn)
where the inequality above follows from Proposition 1(i) for period n+ 1 with d = xn+1.
For part (ii), we only show that αLn ≥ αn since the same argument can be applied to prove βLn ≥ βn.
To begin with, note that by Lemma 2 one can show that E[Vn+1(0, ξn+1(zn))] is concave in zn and its
derivative is decreasing in zn. Therefore, zn = α
L
n is the unique solution of E[Vn+1(0, ξn+1(zn))] = 0.
In addition, the derivative of E[Vn+1(0, ξn+1(zn))] is positive for zn < αLn and negative for zn > αLn .
Therefore, it suffices to show that at zn = αn the following is true
d
dzn
E
[
Vn+1
(
0, xn+1(zn) + yn+1(zn)
)]∣∣∣∣
zn=αn
≥ 0. (64)
It is easy to show by backward induction that, dVn+1
(
0, xn+1(zn) + yn+1(zn)
)
/dzn is bounded for every
zn in terms of a function of Dn, (the last period RN (DN , qN , xN ) + KN (qN , yN ) is bounded for any
DN ). The previous condition allows the interchange between differentiation and integration; cf. Widder
(1989). Accordingly, we have the following,
dE[Vn+1(0, ξn+1)]
dzn
= E[
dVn+1(0, ξn+1)
dzn
]
= E
[
∂Vn+1
∂ξn+1
1{zn>Dn} +
∂Vn+1
∂ξn+1
(
p′n1{zn<Dn} − h′n1{zn>Dn} − c′n(1 + `n)
)]
,
≥ E
[
∂Vn+1
∂xn+1
1{zn>Dn} +
∂Vn+1
∂yn+1
(
p′n1{zn<Dn} − h′n1{zn>Dn} − c′n(1 + `n)
)]
= 0,
where for simplicity we write ∂Vn+1∂ξn+1 :=
∂Vn+1(0, ξn+1)
∂ξn+1
, ∂Vn+1∂xn+1 :=
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂xn+1
and ∂Vn+1∂yn+1 :=
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)
∂yn+1
.
The inequality above is justified using backward induction as follows.
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First, since the marginal contribution of profit of an additional unit of capital for Vn+1(0, ξn+1) is larger
than that of Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1) where ξn+1 = xn+1 + yn+1, we have:
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)/∂yn+1 ≤ ∂Vn+1(0, ξn+1)/∂ξn+1;
∂Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)/∂xn+1 ≤ ∂Vn+1(0, ξn+1)/∂ξn+1.
Second, since zn = αn is the unique optimum of E[Vn+1(xn+1, yn+1)], its derivative at zn = αn is zero.
This proves Eq. (64) and thus completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. For period N , the result readily follows from the optimal solution of the
single-period model. For all other periods, we only prove the result for α¯n ≥ αn since a similar argument
can be used to prove β¯n ≥ βn by replacing `n with in.
By Proposition 2, we have αn ≤ αLn and αLn is by differentiating Eq. (29) and setting the derivative to
zero, that is,
E
[
∂Vn+1(0, ξn+1)
∂ξn+1
(
1{αLn>Dn} + p
′
n1{αLn<Dn} − h′n1{αLn>Dn} − c′n(1 + `n)
)]
= 0. (65)
For any realization of demand Dn = d > 0 the term ∂Vn+1(0, ξn+1(d) )/∂ξn+1(d) is decreasing in d by
the concavity of Vn+1 [cf. Lemma 2 part (2)] and the fact that ξn+1 is increasing in d by Eqs. (15)-(16).
Furthermore, the term 1{αn>d} + p
′
n1{αn<d} − h′n1{αn>d} − c′n(1 + `n) = p′n − (p′n + h′n − 1)1{αn>d} −
c′n(1 + `n), is increasing in d. By Eq. (65) and Lemma 3, one has
E
[
∂Vn+1(0, ξn+1)
∂ξn+1
]
· E [1{αLn>Dn} + p′n1{αLn<Dn} − h′n1{αLn>Dn} − c′n(1 + `n)] ≥ 0.
Since ∂Vn+1(0, ξn+1)/∂ξn+1 ≥ 0 by Lemma 2 part (2), the above inequality implies
E
[
1{αLn>Dn} + p
′
n1{αLn<Dn} − h′n1{αLn>Dn} − c′n(1 + `n)
] ≥ 0, (66)
which, after simple algebra, is equivalent to pn − cn · (1 + `n)− (pn + hn − cn+1)Fn(αLn) ≥ 0. The above
further simplifies to
F (αLn) ≤
pn − cn · (1 + `n)
pn + hn − cn+1 .
Note that the right hand side of the above is less than 1 since cn(1 + `n) + hn ≥ cn+1 by assumption.
Next, by Eqs. (25) and (27), the right hand side in the above inequality is Fn(α¯n). Thus, we have
Fn(α¯n) ≥ Fn(αLn), which means α¯n ≥ αLn . Thus, the proof for α¯n ≥ αn is complete, since αLn ≥ αn by
Proposition 2.
Proof of Theorem 5. Since V Sn (ξ) is increasing and concave in ξ, to prove part (i), we can follow the
proof for Theorem 3 by simplifying the two-variable state (xn, yn) as ξn. The two threshold values α
S
n
and βSn can be obtained via solving the first order conditions under loan with rate `n and deposit with
rate rn, respectively.
To prove part (ii), we only need to prove the first inequality since the second one has been proved
by Proposition 2. This can be done via backward induction. First, for the induction basis, note that
for the last period N , one has V Sn (x + y) = V
L
n (x, y). Next, for the induction step, assume that
the inequality holds for periods n + 1, n + 2, . . . , N . Then, for any ξn+1 = xn+1 + yn+1, one has
V Sn+1(ξn+1) ≥ V Ln+1(xn+1, yn+1). Noting that ξn+1 is a function of ξn, zn and Dn. Taking expectations
w.r.t. Dn yields E[V Sn+1(ξn+1)] ≥ E[V Ln+1(xn+1, yn+1)]. Finally, taking the maximum over zn, we obtain
that the inequality V Sn (ξn) ≥ V Ln (xn, yn) holds, and the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 6. The proof readily follows via a straightforward modification of the proof of
Theorem 1.
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Proof of Theorem 7. The proof follows the same steps as in Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 counterparts,
with some minor modifications.
Proof of Theorem 8. The proof follows readily from the proof for Theorem 3 by replacing the
inventory-cash flow equations to be those of Eqs. (37)-(38).
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